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Party Spirit Made Flesh: The Production of
Legitimacy in the Aftermath of the 2008
Sichuan Earthquake
Christian Sorace*A B S T R A C T
This article argues that the Party retains a tradition of seeking to revitalize its legitimacy
through demonstrations of benevolence and glory. The post-2008 Sichuan earthquake pro-
vided just such an opportunity to mobilize the discourse of “Party spirit” and display the
willingness of cadres to suffer and sacriﬁce themselves on behalf of the people. In addition
to being grist for the propaganda mill, these norms and expectations were implemented in
concrete policy directives and work pressures. Local cadres, who were also earthquake sur-
vivors, started to suffer from exhaustion, insomnia, and depression. After high-proﬁle sui-
cides by several local cadres, the Party adopted a therapeutic discourse in order to address
the psychological needs of individual cadres, though these gentler policies seem doomed to
be short-lived.
OnMay 12, 2008, a 7.9 magnitude earthquake struck theWenchuan region ofSichuan province. It resulted in over 85,000 fatalities, left 5 million people
homeless, and disabled critical communication and transportation infrastructures.
The catastrophe was prolonged as a result of multiple aftershocks, mudslides, and
ﬂoods. The government’s response was praised for allowing unprecedented media
access to the earthquake zone and the emotional response of national leadership,
most notably the compassionate tears of Premier Wen Jiabao.1
The party-state’s monopoly on moral authority was complicated, however, in-
asmuch as “a tremendous surge of volunteers, civic associations, enterprises, and
media from across the country donated their time, money and materials to the*I wish to thank Geremie Barmé, Andrew Mertha, Joseph Mink, Anita Chan, Jonathan Unger, and the
reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful for the opportunity to present an
earlier version of this article at Cornell University’s Contemporary China Initiative Lecture Series.
1. Bin Xu, “Grandpa Wen: Scene and Political Performance,” Sociological Theory 30, no. 2 (2012): 114–29;
Yi Kang, Disaster Management in China in a Changing Era (Berlin: Springer, 2014).
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42 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76relief and reconstruction effort.”2 Although Party leaders lauded the compassion
of the people, they were concerned by the proliferation of nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) and warned against the potential for foreign agents’ inﬁltra-
tion and manipulation. The spontaneous self-organization and compassion dem-
onstrated by ordinary citizens also encroached on the Party’s terrain as provider
for the Chinese people’s welfare.3
The Party’s moral authority was challenged on another dimension by reports
on the collapse of poorly constructed schools that had caused the deaths of thou-
sands of schoolchildren. These were disparagingly referred to as “toufu dreg
schoolhouses.” Allegations of corrupt deals between local ofﬁcials and building
contractors depicted proﬁt-obsessed Party ofﬁcials with an arrant disregard for
life. The Party’s claim to moral authority was imperiled by the protests of griev-
ing parents. Under these political and symbolic pressures, it was imperative for
the postearthquake reconstruction to display the dedication and compassion of
Party ofﬁcials.
This message was emphasized on earthquake-zone banners that read: “An
earthquake doesn’t care, the Party cares” (dizhen wuqing, dang youqing) and
“be grateful to the mighty Communist Party for the new roads, new bridges,
and new houses” (gan’en weida gongchandang, xin lu, xin qiao, xin zhufang). In
ofﬁcial media reports, local residents were supposedly proclaiming: “without the
Party, I would not be alive” (meiyou dang zuzhi, jiu meiyou wo de shengming).
When earthquake survivors voiced discontent with the policies or process of
the reconstruction, a “gratitude education” (gan’en jiaoyu) campaign was initi-
ated to persuade people to adopt the correct attitude in relation to the Party’s
generosity (or to put it more cynically, ‘stick to their lines’).4
From the Party’s vantage point, within three years of reconstruction work it
accomplished a “great leap in development” (kuayueshi fazhan) of public infra-
structure and services, increased regional prosperity and job opportunities, and
guaranteed all earthquake survivors new homes. In an editorial on the third an-2. Shawn Shieh and Deng Guosheng, “An Emerging Civil Society: The Impact of the 2008 Sichuan
Earthquake on Grass-Roots Associations in China,” China Journal, no. 65 (2011): 181–94. See also Bin Xu,
“Consensus Crisis and Civil Society: The Sichuan Earthquake Response and State-Society Relations,” China
Journal, no. 71 (January 2014): 91–108; Jessica Teets, “Post-earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Efforts: The
Emergence of Civil Society in China?,” China Quarterly 198 (2009): 330–47; Yang Guobin, “A Civil Society
Emerges from the Earthquake Rubble,” Yale Global Online, June 5, 2008, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/print/4739.
3. My argument draws inspiration from the following passage of Vivienne Shue: “The speciﬁc content of
their meanings has been continually adjusted and altered to suit the needs of changing times. But the ideals
of Truth, Benevolence, and Glory have been constantly renewed in Chinese discussions around the subject of
good governance and in China’s modern politics of state legitimation and opposition. These three were plainly
visible as governmental claims to authority under Mao . . . they remain central themes in the state legitimation
project of the post-Mao era.”Vivienne Shue, “LegitimacyCrisis inChina?” in State and Society in 21st Century China:
Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation, ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (New York: Routledge, 2004), 50.
4. “China’s Vision for Developing Sichuan’s Post-earthquake Countryside: Turning Unruly Peasants into
Grateful Urban Citizens,” China Quarterly 218 (June 2014): 404–27.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 43niversary of the earthquake by the People’s Daily writing team, the reconstruction
was celebrated as a “miracle” (qiji) made possible due to the “faith” (xinnian) of
the Communist Party.5 According the Party’s discursive rationality, it had been
able to achieve miracles through the mobilization of the “Party spirit” (dangxing)
of its cadres. Due to the cultivation of Party spirit, cadres had been expected to
place the people and Party above their own personal interest.
Scholars are apt to dismiss this Communist Party propaganda discourse as
“obsolete and far-fetched.”6 As Anne-Marie Brady observes: “Many China spe-
cialists seem to have taken it as an article of faith that the CCP government is
doomed and the propaganda state is dead.”7 Even scholars like Brady who note
the importance of propaganda for “guaranteeing the CCP’s ongoing legitimacy
and hold on power” tend to dismiss the importance of its discursive content.8
I suggest that the content of Party propaganda is signiﬁcant in the way it in-
sistently reminds China’s citizens that their well-being is the result of its benev-
olence. The Party’s claim to benevolence in turn depends on the willingness of
Communist Party cadres to sacriﬁce themselves for the Party and the people.
The discursive logic of sacriﬁce, debt, and gratitude is the modular blueprint
of Party legitimacy. In the place of “earthquake,” one can insert “class enemy,”
“American imperialism,” “SARS,” “poverty,” or whatever plays the role of antag-
onist at the time.
In the following section of this article, I will demonstrate how the Party engi-
neered “glory” in the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake by turning to
Party spirit. The term Party spirit (dangxing) is wielded to demand from relevant
cadres (ganbu) at such times a style of work premised on a lifelong commitment
of submission to the Party. I suggest that this discourse of Party spirit exerts a
grid-like network of norms, expectations, prohibitions, and pressures on such
Communist Party cadres. The section of this article will provide examples of pro-
paganda narratives of model cadres who reportedly were so dedicated to their
reconstruction work at Wenchuan that they neglected their health, resulting in
their untimely deaths. They follow a formula that stretches back to the Party vi-
sion ofMaoist times in which “whatever smacks toomuch of the human creature—
appetite, feeling, sensibility, sensuality, imagination, fear, passion, lust, self-interest,
etc.—is purged and repressed so that the all-too-human is sublimated with vio-5. Christian Sorace, “The Communist Party’s Miracle? The Alchemy of Turning Post-disaster Recon-
struction into Great Leap Development,” Comparative Politics (July 2015): 479–98.
6. Huang Haifeng’s argument that propaganda is mainly used “to signal the government’s strength in
maintaining social control and political order” downplays the Party’s obsessive control over the wording and
content of propaganda. The fact that propaganda may be badly written does not make it arbitrary. See Huang
Haifeng, “Propaganda as Signaling,” Comparative Politics (July 2015): 419, 420.
7. Ann-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China
(Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littleﬁeld, 2009), 183.
8. Ibid., 1.
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44 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76lence into the superhuman and even inhuman realm” of Party spirit.9 In the after-
math of the earthquake, the creaturely frailties of “human nature” (renxing) were
to be overcome, such as concern for personal safety and depression over the deaths
of friends and family.
The article’s third section demonstrates how the norms and expectations of
Party spirit were conveyed in discourses, policy directives, work pressures, and
punitive sanctions. The fourth and ﬁfth sections trace how the discourse of Party
spirit inscribed itself on the bodies of cadres, regardless of their individual con-
victions and moral dispositions. Local cadres who were also earthquake survi-
vors) started to exhibit symptoms of exhaustion, depression, and post–traumatic
stress disorder. The article will discuss why, after several cadres committed sui-
cide, Party leaders partially changed course and responded with policy measures
based on a therapeutic discourse of self-care targeting the cadre as an individual.
To capture the Party’s discursive logic, the article draws from a signiﬁcant
body of Chinese textual material ranging from mass media accounts, published
Party materials, and internally circulated Party work reports, in order to examine
the effects of the Party’s discursive and propaganda models on concrete policies
and cadres’ lives. My examination of these effects is based on over 18 months of
ﬁeldwork from January 2012 to August 2013, during which I conducted research
in ﬁve municipalities, seven county seats, six rural townships, and seven villages
affected by the 2008 earthquake. In the ﬁeld, I conducted interviews with local
cadres administratively ranked at the village, township, and county levels. For the
majority of interviews, I was introduced to cadres through networks of friends,
scholars, NGOs, and the cadres I had previously interviewed. Interviews varied
in both duration and location, ranging from impromptu dinners, informal car
trips, to formal discussions conducted in an ofﬁce setting. I also draw upon inter-
view transcripts conducted by local researchers.
My article does not claim that all cadres were saintly or pure. I frequently heard
colorful rumors about cadre corruption and, on occasion, even witnessed villagers
hurling abuse at cadres who in their eyes misappropriated funds and ﬁendishly
proﬁted from the reconstruction. The purpose of this article is not to vindicate or
disprove such allegations but to show how the mechanics of Party legitimacy and
the discourse of Party spirit continue to operate whether or not cadres are corrupt.THE DISCOURSE OF PARTY SPIRIT
In his 1924 eulogy for Lenin, Stalin said, “Comrades, we Communists are people
of a special mold. We are made of a special stuff.”10 In the Soviet Union, the of-9. Wang Ban, The Sublime Figure of History: Aesthetics and Politics in Twentieth Century China (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 2.
10. J. V. Stalin, “On theDeath of Lenin” (January 30, 1924), public translation available at https://www.marxists
.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/01/30.htm
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 45ﬁcial term for this “special stuff” was partiinost’ or “Party spirit,” a term translated
into Chinese as dangxing, literally, the “character” or “nature” of the Party.
The Communist Party employs the discourse of Party spirit to establish the
proper relationship between the individual cadre and the Party organization.11
Admission into the Chinese Party requires candidates to swear an oath in front
of the Party ﬂag in which they declare that they are willing to “be ready at all times
to sacriﬁce . . . all for the Party and the people, and never betray the Party.”12
In article 3, clause 3 of the Party Constitution, Party members are required to
“subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the Party and the people”
and in doing so be “the ﬁrst to bear hardships and the last to enjoy comforts.”13 At
the core of how the Party understands and legitimates itself is the differentiation
between “Party spirit” (dangxing) and “human nature” (renxing). To put it sim-
ply: it is the collective over the individual, the politically engineered over the per-
sonally motivated. According to Liu Shaoqi’s classic 1939 handbook How to Be a
Good Communist, “unhesitating readiness to sacriﬁce personal interests and even
one’s life for the Party and for the proletariat and for the emancipation of the na-
tion and of all mankind—this is one expression of what we usually describe as
“Party spirit,” “Party sense,” or “sense of organization.” It is the highest expres-
sion of communist morality, of the principled nature of the party of the proletariat
and of the purest proletarian class-consciousness.”14
From the perspective of historical materialism, communist morality does not
arise from an innate goodness in human nature; it has to be learned.15 A cadre’s
Party spirit is the product of submission to Party discipline, management, and11. It is important to note that the deﬁnition of Party spirit has a complex and contested history that can
only be mentioned in passing here. During the Mao era, Party spirit manifested the “class character” (jiejixing)
of the Communist Party. After Mao’s death and the abandonment of class struggle as the Party’s guiding
platform, theorist and propagandist Hu Qiaomu presciently warned in 1982: “If we leave class struggle and
discuss the character of the people [renminxing], we will have lost our direction.” Without the ideology of class
struggle as its animating principle and goal, Hu worried that Party spirit would be emptied of its ideological
content, vitality, and charisma. See Hu Qiaomu, “Guanyu xinwen gongzuo de dangxing he ‘renminxing’ wenti”
[Regarding the problem of Party spirit and popular character in news work], in Hu Qiaomu ji di er juan [The
collected works of Hu Qiaomu] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 2:527.
12. The Party Oath can be found in Chinese at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64156/65682/4440819.html.
13. A complete English version text of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party is available at
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188090.html.
14. Liu Shaoqi, How to Be a Good Communist (1939), public translation available at https://www
.marxists.org/reference/archive/liu-shaoqi/1939/how-to-be/ch06.htm.
15. In Chinese philosophy, there is a deep-rooted conviction in human malleability and the importance
of education in shaping one’s moral character. In the terse words of Xunzi, “people’s nature is bad. Their
goodness is a matter of deliberate effort.” Xunzi compares human nature to “crooked wood” that must be
straightened through the “transforming inﬂuence of teachers and models.” The CCP adopted a similar
worldview that continues to shape the Party’s propaganda efforts and governance strategies. Xunzi, The
Complete Text, trans. by Eric L. Hutton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 248. For an
overview of “exemplarity” in Chinese statecraft, see Børge Bakken, The Exemplary Society: Human Improve-
ment, Social Control, and the Dangers of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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46 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76molding.16 After induction into the Party, a cadre’s life belongs to the Party
similar to how St. Augustine conceptualized the body as a vessel of the Lord.17
If Party spirit is the Word, it is engraved on the ﬂesh through a network of or-
ganizational power, training sessions, rituals, confessional practices, exhortations,
media hype, promotion incentives, and punishments.18 The Party’s ideological and
organizational apparatuses are designed to produce, cultivate, and maintain the
“special stuff” of Party spirit in the body of the cadre.19
This lifelong cultivation of the individual cadre is not primarily for personal
career advancement; it is for the glory of the Party, what Ken Jowitt, a Soviet spe-
cialist, referred to as the signature “charismatic impersonality” of the Party orga-
nization in Leninist regimes.20 Through the mechanism of cadre sacriﬁce in par-
ticular, Party spirit is transferred from the individual to the organization in the
form of glory. In lieu of an electoral mandate to rule, Party legitimacy requires
the constant production, exaltation, and acclamation of glory.21
Consequently, Party legitimacy can beneﬁt from natural disasters, which pro-
vide opportunities for themobilization of Party spirit and display of benevolence.2216. Frank Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
17. For Augustine, God is the ultimate and only reference point through which human life is meaningful:
“For just as that which gives life to the ﬂesh is not something derived from the ﬂesh, but something above it, so
that which makes the life of man blessed is not something derived from him, but something above him.”
On this basis, Augustine argues that a Christian should not seek praise and ﬂattery for their good deeds, “for
you are not anything at all in yourself.” Similarly, under Communist Party rule, according to organizational
principles, cadres are not permitted to act in their own name and enrich themselves. A cadre’s purpose is
to manifest the glory of the Party. Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 961. For a selective list of political theological readings of the Communist
Party, see David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1994); Ban Wang, “In the Beginning Is the Word: Popular Democracy and Mao’s
Little Red Book,” in Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History, ed. Alexander C. Cook (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 266–77; Michael Dutton, “Mango Mao: Infections of the Sacred,” Public Culture 16, no. 2
(2004): 161–87; Christian Sorace, “Saint Mao,” Telos 151 (Summer 2010): 173–91.
18. My understanding of the ﬂesh as a modern political category and production site of legitimacy is in-
spired by the work of Eric Santner: The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sover-
eignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), and The Weight of All Flesh: On the Subject-Matter of
Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
19. I am drawing from Franz Schurmann’s classic argument that the Party governs its own members
through the dual mechanisms of ideological and organizational control; see Ideology and Organization in
Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
20. Ken Jowitt,NewWorld Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
21. The term “acclamations of glory” is borrowed from Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and The Glory: For
a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). For a
discussion of “glory” as a pillar of Party legitimacy, see Shue, “Legitimacy Crisis in China?”
22. There are also other beneﬁts to crisis governance: “Deftly employed, the rhetoric of crisis helps to le-
gitimate extraordinary interventions by social and political elites, subvert the standard bureaucratic procedures
that characterize normal politics and create political space for extraordinary mobilizations of resources to
overcome challenges.” See Patricia Thornton, “Crisis and Governance: SARS and the Resilience of the Chinese
Body Politics,” China Journal, no. 61 (2009): 26.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 47Party propagandists are indeed quite candid about the “utilization of natural disas-
ters as a focus for central and local government propagandawork. CCPpropaganda
specialists recommend this as a particularly useful means of raising governmental
approval ratings.”23 Although the Party’s legitimacy beneﬁts from high approval
ratings, it does not require this (otherwise, how can we explain the Party’s seem-
ingly stubborn commitment to narratives and models that are no longer appealing
or believable in the eyes of many Chinese citizens?). Instead of a hazy notion of
public approval, I suggest that the real locus of Party legitimacy is the production
of its benevolence and glory.PARTY SPIRIT IN THE WORDS OF THE DYING
Confucius declared, “When a bird is about to die, his song is sad; when a man is
about to die, his words are true.”24 But the poignant aura of last words is dimin-
ished if these are ventriloquized, fabricated, or clichéd. How then to explain Party
propaganda in which a model cadre’s last words are slogans that express grati-
tude for the life granted by the Party?
One answer comes from Haiyan Lee’s description of hagiographical accounts
of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) martyrs as a propaganda genre. “The mo-
ment of death is always formulaically stylized and saturated with ideological sig-
niﬁcation. Invariably Mao’s instruction or the Party’s bounty would ﬂash across
the hero’s mind as he (sometimes she) lies dying and, whenever possible, the last
breath is expended on revolutionary slogans. There is absolutely no room to
question the motivation for the sacriﬁce or the meaning of death.”25 Lee argues
that the “aestheticization and de-individualization of death” produces the effects
of what she calls the “military sublime.”26 A nearly identical narrative structure
and repertoire of tropes are used in propaganda accounts of themodel Party cadre,
which alongside the PLA martyr contribute to the Communist Party’s “charisma
of power.”27
A second answer is that the purpose of Communist Party propaganda is not
the authenticity and accuracy of its representation of reality; it is supposed to be
idealized. According to Børge Bakken, in traditional Chinese culture, authority is
represented in models and normative ideals that are to be studied and emulated.
The Party continues this tradition by elevating model cadres, soldiers, workers,23. Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 188.
24. In the commentary on his translation of The Analects, Simon Leys compares this line to Shakespeare’s
Richard II: “The tongues of dying men / Enforce attention, like deep harmony.” See Confucius, The Analects, ed.
Michael Nylan, trans. Simon Leys (New York: Norton, 2014), 35.
25. Haiyan Lee, “The Charisma of Power and the Military Sublime in Tiananmen Square,” Journal of Asian
Studies 70, no. 2 (2011): 409.
26. Ibid., 406.
27. Ibid., 399.
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48 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76work units, urban communities, and whomever or whatever it regards as useful
for exemplifying both its authority and the wisdom of its policies. However,
Bakken also suggests that “the fading power of the model is linked to the general
crisis of power and problems of legitimacy for the present regime.”28 Whereas
models instilled devotion during the Mao era,29 what is their role in an age of
political disenchantment, public cynicism, and Party corruption?30 What be-
comes of a political system based on moral exemplarity and emulation, when
the authority of models is no longer believed in?
The rational response would seem to be: “If the models are no longer working,
stop using them.” However, such a seemingly practical suggestion is insensitive
to what Geertz referred to as the “inherent sacredness of sovereign power” and
the need for whoever is in power to maintain it.31 For all of the Communist
Party’s adaptability, ﬂuidity, and ruthless pragmatism, it cannot divest itself of
propaganda models without losing the symbolic support of its authority. Xi
Jinping seems to intuitively grasp the indispensability of the appearance of faith
especially in an age of rampant corruption and disbelief.
One suchmodel cadrewhomXi Jinping has cited as an inspirationwas a county-
level Party secretary half a century ago named Jiao Yulu, whose life and death be-
came famous as a model throughout China during the 1960s. Jiao had been as-
signed to serve as county Party secretary of Lankao county in Henan province in
1962, during the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward. Agriculture in parts of
the county were endangered by spreading sand dunes, and Jiao’s love for the people
motivated him to forgo rest despite severe pain he felt in his side, while he led the
masses to remove the dunes. According to Charles Laughlin, “consumed by his
work, Jiao Yulu is not even aware of the nature and seriousness of his illness and
seeks no medical attention until he is incapacitated.”32 In the moments before
his death, Jiao can only think of the Party and the suffering people of Lankao.
His last recordedwords are: “I only have one request after I’mgone; I want the Party
to send me back to Lankao and bury me in one of the sand dunes. I might be dead,
but I want to make sure you get those dunes under control.”3328. Bakken, Exemplary Society, 194.
29. Anita Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Gen-
eration (London: Macmillan, 1985).
30. Wu Si, Qian guize: Zhongguo lishi zhong de zhenshi youxi [The hidden rules: Real games of Chinese
history] (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2009); Jiwei Ci, Moral China in the Age of Reform (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014); Xiaoying Wang, “The Post-Communist Personality: The Spectre of China’s
Capitalist Market Reforms,” China Journal, no. 47 (January 2002): 1–17.
31. Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reﬂections on the Symbolics of Power,” in Rites of
Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics since the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1985), 13–38.
32. Charles A. Laughlin, Chinese Reportage: The Aesthetics of Historical Experience (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2002), 259.
33. Ibid.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 49The Jiao Yulu story has been propagated at various critical political junctures
in the past few decades. In the wake of the armed suppression of the Tiananmen
protests, then Standing Committee Member of the Politburo Li Ruihuan
launched a campaign in the early 1990s to study the “spirit of Jiao Yulu.”Accord-
ing to Geremie Barmé, Jiao Yulu “was an icon aimed at reconciling the masses
with the party by convincing them that there are—or at least were—good and
incorruptible cadres.”34 A 1991 ﬁlm about Jiao Yulu was a box ofﬁce success
and reportedly moved people to tears.
In 1990 Xi Jinping composed a classical-style poem called “Recovering the
Memory of Jiao Yulu” in which he praised Jiao as a model and kindred political
spirit.35 One verse reads: “As I yearn for you one night after another / Your heart
and mine are cleansed together.”36 Later, as Party general secretary, Xi exhorted
county-level cadres to “compare [themselves] to and emulate the virtuous”model
of Jiao Yulu.37 Xi has also conducted multiple trips to Lankao county and has re-
marked that “each time I step onto the soil of Lankao, I become emotional.”
After the Sichuan earthquake, propaganda groups were organized to collect
stories of “progressive model cadres” who sacriﬁced themselves like Jiao Yulu.38
Each story conforms to a standard story line in which the cadre prioritizes the
reconstruction mission above any personal considerations. Party spirit defeats
the human tendency to grieve and feel self-pity. With tremendous fortitude,
the cadre does not spend time openly mourning dead relatives or consoling those
who survived. Dedicated to work, the cadre compromises his or her health, ig-
nores medical advice, falls ill, ignores the doctor’s advice to rest, checks out of
the hospital, returns to work, and exacerbates the illness to the point of death.
The deathbed scene provides a denouement in which the cadre’s last words are
work instructions to fellow comrades or an expression of gratitude to the Party.
Such stories are supposed to be constructed out of real characters. One week
before the earthquake, Yu Zhaorong, chair of the Wenchuan County People’s
Consultative Conference, was diagnosed with pulmonary heart disease and high34. Geremie R. Barmé, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2000), 107–8.
35. The cí was also a poetic form favored by Mao Zedong. Indeed, Mao’s song lyrics were even set to music
and sung during the Cultural Revolution. Xi’s poem recently made headlines during Xi’s state visit to the United
Kingdom in October 2015 when the Chinese embassy arranged for a British student to recite Xi’s poem as a
tribute of respect. “Xi Jinping: China Has Taught UK Schools Discipline—and Has Learned about Play,”
Guardian, October 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/xi-jinping-china-taught-uk
-schools-discipline-learned-about-play.
36. Ibid.; the Chinese original can be found on Baidu at http://baike.baidu.com/view/12514523.htm.
37. “Xi Jinping chongfang lankao: Jiao Yulu jingshen shi yonghengde” [Xi Jinping returns to Lankao:
The Jiao Yulu spirit is eternal], Xinhua, March 17, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-03/17
/c_119810080.htm.
38. Zheng Degang, “Kangzhen jiuzai bairi: 67 ming ganbu yin linzhen tuisuo deng xingwei bei chufen” [One
hundred days of earthquake resistance and disaster relief: 67 cadres disciplined for getting cold feet], Renmin
ribao, August 19, 2008.
This content downloaded from 130.056.106.027 on February 05, 2018 16:45:08 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
50 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76blood pressure. When the earthquake struck, he reportedly canceled his planned
medical treatment in order to devote himself to relief and reconstruction work.
According to a report of the Wenchuan county Party Organization Department,
Yu Zhaorong explained his decision to forgo medical treatment in the language
of Party spirit: “I am a Communist Party member; I am a cadre the Party has
cultivated for many years; during the moment of calamity, I must not escape
right before the battle.”39 The implication is that the cadre no longer has a self-
hood to preserve outside of the one cultivated by the Party. In the weeks following
the earthquake, the narrative was that Yu worked overtime, slept nights in his car,
and ate only sparse rations. Even after he collapsed at his post and was forced to
check into a hospital, he returned to work while sick. The report also depicts Yu’s
stoic internalization of grief over the death of his son-in-law: “He could only allow
his tears to fall toward his heart, and did not ask anything from the organization.”
Wang Jihong, former Wenchuan county party standing committee member
and head of the Wenchuan county discipline inspection committee, was reported
to have followed a similar pattern. When the earthquake struck, he was in the
hospital due to intestinal hemorrhaging. Immediately after the quake, according
to the narrative, he discharged himself so he could participate in emergency evac-
uation work throughout Wenchuan’s remote and scattered localities:
He was still concerned with work in his heart; his left hand inserted his intravenous
drip into his arm, while his right hand clasped his cell-phone to his ear, and in a
feeble voice he exhorted his comrades in the Discipline Inspection Commission
ofﬁce: “My illness is not serious. You must not allow comrades to visit me in
Chengdu. In the next two days, there will be bids for the reconstruction projects.
We must send specialists to supervise. There can be absolutely no mistakes. We
must organize a study session of the Party Center’s four important documents
on ﬁghting corruption. We must make sure everything arrives at its place.” Two
minutes after hanging up the phone, his breath became hurried and his complex-
ion pale as his pulse disappeared, without time to utter one sentence to his family
before he passed away.40
The theme of self-sacriﬁce is not limited to death. Huang Shunquan, head of a
village located in Pengzhou, was helping villagers transport cement needed for re-39.Wenchuanxian ganbu duiwu zhuangkuang gongzuo huibao [Wenchuan county cadre ranks situation
work report]. I acquired this document from an internal archive within the Sichuan Party School, and its
identifying author and document serial number have been removed. It is likely that it originated from the
Party’s organization department.
40. Wenchuanxian jiwei jianchaju (Wenchuan county discipline inspection commission supervisory ofﬁce),
“Zuo dang de zhongcheng weishi, dang qunzhong de tiexin ren, Wenchuanxian jiwei jianchaju yong xingdong
quanshi jijian ganbu de biaozhun” [To serve as a loyal guardian of the Party and person intimate with the
masses: Using actions to perform the standards of a disciplinary inspection cadre], undated document, from
Sichuan Party School archive.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 51construction of people’s houses when his vehicle collided with a truck on amoun-
tain road. According to a report from his Party branch, while attempting to “en-
sure the cement did not spill,”Huang’s left leg was crushed beneath the wheel of a
truck and required amputation. In the hospital, Huang’s daughter allegedly com-
plained that even after the accident “our family issues are not as important as
helping villagers. Even right now, he is eager to leave the hospital and return to
work.”41
These exemplary stories were also strategically deployed for “stability mainte-
nance” (wei wen) work—a Party keyword that designates the importance of
maintaining social order and preventing public protests above all else.42 In
Qingchuan county, Muyu middle school collapsed, causing several dozen inju-
ries and deaths. According to a work report of the county mass work bureau, par-
ents mourning the deaths of their children started to demand that county ofﬁ-
cials investigate the allegedly substandard construction quality of the schools
that collapsed on their children. In order to placate their outrage, bureau chief
Wang Shikun reportedly conveyed to the protestors that even though many
members from his own family died, he did not abandon his post. A small work
team was organized and dispatched to each of the victims’ families in order to
carry out “thought work” (sixiang gongzuo) and to “calm the situation.” Accord-
ing to the report, “no cadre had requested a leave of absence or left their post due
to the death of family members or personal injuries. . . . Because of the long pe-
riod on the road under the scorching sun without a change of clothing and no-
where to shower, one after another, to different degree, everyone fell ill, but no
one shrank from the task.”43 The clear message was that the disaster victims
should be grateful for the Party’s sacriﬁce on their behalf, while indirectly dele-
gitimizing their basis for complaint. At the same time, another message was sent
to the bureau’s administrative superiors that the county bureau’s cadres had
spared no personal cost in preventing a mass protest.“EATING BITTERNESS” IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE EARTHQUAKE
The implausibility of these propaganda models would seem to conﬁrm that the
propaganda apparatus no longer is effective and suggests why people no longer41. Yu Zaigu and Li Yang, “Wei bao chongjian wuzi Pengzhou shi cun zhuren Huang shunquan shoushang
jiezhi” [Protecting reconstruction materials Pengzhou Muncipality village head Huang Shunquan sustained
injuries that required amputation], Chengdu wanbao, October 27, 2008, http://sichuan.scol.com.cn/sczh
/20081027/2008102770332.htm.
42. Xie Yue, “The Political Logic ofWeiwen in Contemporary China,” Issues & Studies 48, no. 2 (2012): 1–41.
43. Zhonggong qingchuan xianwei qunzhong gongzuo ju (Qingchuan county Party mass work bureau),
“Guanyu bao song ‘5.12’ dadizhen wo xian xinfang ganbu suo zuo gongzuo de bao gao” [Work report regarding
county letters-and-visits cadres’ work following the great May 12 earthquake], internal document, June 5, 2008.
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52 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76pay serious attention to Party propaganda. The Party leadership nevertheless
habitually turns to this modus operandi. And in addition to seeking to bolster
legitimacy (no matter how clumsily), this propaganda exerts pressure on the
lives of cadres, regardless of their personal convictions. Especially during political
campaigns and emergency mobilizations, the discourse of Party spirit deﬁnes
the parameters in which cadre political performance is evaluated, praised, or
punished.
In the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, local Party cadres were re-
quired to put their Party spirit into practice when engaging in rescue and relief
efforts alongside the military. Their tasks involved the relocation of survivors into
temporary shelters, the distribution of relief goods, epidemic prevention, and the
recovery and removal of bodies. In addition, in order to initiate postquake recon-
struction, local cadres in tandemwith “provincial partners” (duikou zhiyuan) for-
mulated and implemented reconstruction plans. This involved a range of tasks
from housing reconstruction to medium- to long-term economic planning. At
each stage of this process cadres were expected to manifest the Party spirit of
“tireless struggle” and to “fear no sacriﬁce.”44 They were expected to do so even
thoughmany of these cadres were earthquake survivors who had lost their houses
and loved ones.
In a speech delivered a year and a half after the earthquake, in early 2010,
Wenchuan county Party Secretary Qing Lidong praised local cadres as people
who were willing to “engage in work an ordinary person would not be willing
to take on and to eat bitterness that ordinary people are not capable of eating.”45
A capacity to endure suffering is, in the Party’s narrative, a distinguishing char-
acteristic of the Communist Party cadre.
Party spirit requires the suppression of human nature. Internal Party docu-
ments and department work reports unambiguously stipulated that during disas-
ter rescue operations “cadres must always ﬁrst rescue others” before family mem-
bers and friends.46 Likewise, when dispensing relief materials, “cadres must ﬁrst
think of the broad masses” before considering their own needs. According to an
interview with a leading Wenchuan county cadre, the “cadre evaluation stan-
dards for postearthquake work were extremely strict. They were ﬁrst and fore-
most to remain side-by-side with the masses. If the masses still lived in tents,44. Wang Bin, “Zai shi jie xianwei di 32 ci changwei (kuoda) huiyishang de jianghua” (speech given at the
32nd meeting of the tenth county standing committee enlarged conference), September 5, 2008.
45. Qing Lidong, “Pa poshang kan zhua zhongdian, xushi tupo cu kuayue” [Climbing up a slope on the
threshold of grasping the important points, store up power to break through and step across], Zai jiakuai tuijin
shi da zhongdian gongzuo dongyuan huishang de jianghua (speech given at the conference for the accelerated
promotion of 10 large important points work mobilization conference), di 5 qi, zongdi 96 qi (2010).
46.Wenchuanxian ganbu duiwu zhuangkuang gongzuo huibao.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 53you had to live in a tent. If the masses didn’t have tents, you couldn’t have a tent.
If the masses didn’t have relief supplies, such as bottled water and dried goods,
you could not have any relief supplies.”47 A professor from Dujiangyan Munic-
ipality Communist Party School explained that if cadres complained about “eat-
ing bitterness” such as exhaustion, work pressure, and low wages, their superiors
would admonish them, asking, “Why did you join the Party if you wanted com-
fort or money?”48
For cadres who failed to display Party spirit, the Party availed itself of disci-
plinary measures and rhetorical denunciations. Organizational sanctions such
as demotions or expulsion from the Party were meted out to cadres caught “leav-
ing their work post without permission,” “getting cold feet,” and “shirking re-
sponsibilities.”49 A grassroots cadre from Qingchuan explained that “decisions
to ﬁre errant cadres were ordered by higher level ofﬁcials. Any cadres not at their
work posts would be ﬁred; if a cadre ﬁrst went to check on his children, he would
be ﬁred.”50 When I asked him if he thought that the policy was extreme, he ar-
gued that these “political sacriﬁcial objects” were necessary to reinforce “positive
models of behavior.”When I asked the Dujiangyan Party School professor about
these punishments, he responded, “While it is totally understandable from the
perspective of human nature to be afraid of rockslides and aftershocks, and to
want to make sure your loved ones are okay, Party spirit demands that you put
your job before everything else.”
The discourse of Party spirit also underpinned the decision to transform post-
disaster reconstruction into what planning documents described as a model of
“great leap development.” That is to say, the Party’s goal was to accomplish 20
to 30 years of development within two to three years of reconstruction, a policy
that rested totally on the mobilization and self-sacriﬁce of cadres. The ambitious
postquake goals and timeframes required cadres to expend themselves in the
project of reconstruction. As a consequence, cadres were expected to work on lit-
tle sleep. The constant work pressures and lack of rest were reinforced with slo-
gans such as “white plus black” (bai jia hei) (day and night) and “ﬁve plus two”
(wu jia er) (weekday and weekend), which in current vernacular translates to
“24/7” dedication and availability. The idea that development would be paid
for with the ﬂesh of individual cadres was explicitly rendered in the following47. Interview, Wenchuan county seat, March 2013.
48. Interview, January 2013.
49. Wang Bin, “Zai zhonggong wenchuan xianwei shi jie qi ci quanti (kuada) huiyi shang de jianghua”
(speech given at the seventh meeting of the entire tenth county standing committee enlarged conference),
September 5, 2008.
50. Interview with township ofﬁcial, Qingchuan, May 2013.
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54 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76Party slogan: “Shed blood and sweat but not tears; shed skin, shed ﬂesh, but do
not fall behind!” (Liuxue liuhan bu liulei, diaopi diaorou bu diaodui).51THE FRAGILITY OF HUMAN NATURE
The campaign-style mobilization of Party cadres who were earthquake survivors
quickly resulted in symptoms of stress, exhaustion, and depression. A survey con-
ducted in 2009 by the Dujiangyan Municipal Party School of 3,000 grassroots
cadres revealed that in the aftermath of the earthquake 86 percent of respondents
suffered from insomnia; 78 percent frequently experienced “dread” and “restless
anxiety”; 73 percent were afraid of aftershocks and found it difﬁcult to concen-
trate; 78 percent felt downcast, sorrowful, and depressed; and 77 percent reported
that they were irritable and quicker to lose their temper. Overall, the report con-
cluded that the majority of local grassroots cadres were in a state of “physical and
emotional exhaustion”52 that resembles what Arthur Kleinman referred to as
the “somatic idioms of distress”53 in a political culture reluctant to acknowledge
psychological vulnerability.
Research by Chen Qiu and Yan Qianmin reported that the deteriorating psy-
chological conditions of these local grassroots cadres were invisible within a sys-
tem that took for granted their structural role and expected their self-sacriﬁce.54
The report was based on a survey conducted from November through December
2008, in which a majority of respondents described themselves as suffering from
“depression,” “obsessive compulsive symptoms,” “anxiety,” “panic,” “somatoform
disorders,” and other “nervous disorders.” They reported symptoms of forget-
fulness, lack of energy, inability to control temper, and lack of hope for the fu-
ture. An estimated 15 percent reported entertaining the thought of suicide.
After the earthquake, work pressure did not allow cadres to spend time with
their families, which contributed to an increased sense of isolation and guilt. Ac-
cording to the aforementioned report, “because of the intensity of work it’s dif-51. “Feixu shang da xie Qingchuan—Qingchuanxian kexue tuijin zaihou huifu chongjian jishi” [Writing
Qingchuan on the ruins—Qingchuan county scientiﬁcally advancing postdisaster restoration and recon-
struction record of events], Sichuan ribao, May 5, 2010, http://sichuandaily.scol.com.cn/2010/05/05
/2010050563722402441.htm.
52. Dujiangyanshi dangxiao (Dujiangyan Communist Party school), “Huifu, fazhan, chuangxin: 2009
nian zaihou chongjian youxiu yanjiu wenji xuanbian” [Reconstruction, development, innovation: Selected
works of excellent research reports regarding the 2009 postdisaster reconstruction situation], internal
publication, 2009, 5–8.
53. Arthur Kleinman, “Neurasthenia and Depression: A Study of Somatization and Culture in China,”
Culture, Medicine, Psychiatry 6, no. 2 (1982): 117–90.
54. Chen Qiu and Yan Qianmin, “Zaihou wenchuan jiceng ganbu xinli jiankang zhuangkuang diaocha
ji tiaoshi duice yanjiu” [Postdisaster Wenchuan grassroots cadres psychological health situation investigation
and proposed remedies], Xinan minzu daxue xuebao [Southwestern University for Nationalities journal]
2 (2011): 85–89.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 55ﬁcult for cadres to show concern for their own families and close relatives; many
cadres experience guilt and blame themselves for neglecting their families.”55
These unresolved tensions between Party spirit and human nature were felt in
pangs of guilt and psychological torment.
To overcome their depression, according to PRC publications, local cadres re-
portedly relied on the language of Party spirit and demanded from themselves
“willpower to overcome difﬁculties in order not to fail to live up to the nation
and people’s expectations and compassion and not let down the earthquake sur-
vivors who lost loved ones.”56 Some cadres did seek to live up to the Party’s im-
age. A township Party secretary whose daughter had died when the local school
collapsed told me, “At ﬁrst I was numb and didn’t want to do anything. Then, I
thought to myself it is a natural disaster, many people suffered the same fate, and
we have received the country’s support, so I need to excel at my work and pull
myself together. I’ve kept working, but sometimes in the middle of the night I
think of these things and can’t fall back asleep.”57 When I asked him whether
he was angry over the shoddy construction materials used in the school building
that collapsed on his daughter, he stared into the distance and shook his head.
His role as a Party cadre prohibited public articulation of grief (especially to a
foreign researcher) that might contradict the Party line.
In summer 2008, the head of the Mianyang Municipal Party School and Ad-
ministrative Management School conducted a series of interviews with town-
ship-level Party secretaries from Beichuan county to record their experiences
during the earthquake. In June 2008, he interviewed a township-level cadre whom
the interview transcript describes as ill at ease, compulsively smoking, and lapsing
into inaudible mumbles and long silences. The cadre recounted personal traumas,
including how he identiﬁed the corpse of his wife by her hair because her face was
unrecognizable, and the moment he heard his mother calling for help from be-
neath a collapsed building but realized that he could not rescue her without the
proper machinery.58 He did not elaborate upon the death of his daughter. Disre-
garding his personal tragedy he was assigned to emergency patrols between
Beichuan county seat and administratively subordinate local townships.59 His in-
terview responses oscillated between intense self-hatred and blame for the death
of his family and Party language that “personal matters are insigniﬁcant com-
pared to those of the country.”60 At one point, he recounted the story of another55. Chen and Yan, “Ganbu xinli,” 88.
56. Ibid.
57. Interview with village Party Secretary, Yingxiu, June 2012.
58. A Jian, Zai nanzhong: Shendu fangtan beichuan xiangzhen shuji [In the midst of difﬁculty: In-depth
interviews with Beichuan Township Party secretaries] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2009), 285.
59. Ibid., 277.
60. Ibid., 279.
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56 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76local Party secretary who fortunately was sitting next to a water cooler when the
building collapsed and thus managed to stay alive for days until he was rescued:
“After the military police pulled him from the rubble, he immediately threw him-
self back into work.”61 The interview transcript concludes with an update from
January 2009 when the cadre was visited at a mental health clinic ( jingshen
weisheng zhongxin) where he had been admitted for depression. A month later
he returned to work, and his demeanor at work was described by a fellow cadre
as silent for hours, head in hands, only occasionally looking up to say, “My wife,
daughter, and mother are gone. At night I can’t sleep . . . ”
This was not an anomalous case. I obtained an internal Party organization Ex-
cel spreadsheet that lists the postearthquake situation of over 2,300 cadres from
Beichuan county and its subordinate townships and villages.62 For each entry,
details are provided regarding the individual cadre’s personal status, the status
of family members, and urgent problems in need of attention. The spreadsheet
records that over 1,200 cadres had lost their homes (this estimate is based only
on the categories “without home,” “homeless,” and “collapsed house” and ex-
cludes categories such as “damaged” and “dangerous housing”). Under the
“urgent problems in need of attention” section, “no money” and an inability to
afford their child’s school fees were listed almost ubiquitously. One cadre’s situ-
ation is described as “no home, and wife currently in hospital with no one to look
after her.”
Cadres throughout the earthquake zone suffered from a combination of work
pressure and personal tragedy. According to a social worker inWenchuan county,
“cadres confessed to me that they hoped to be dismissed from their jobs to relieve
them of the pressure of working in the postearthquake areas.”63 The social worker
cited “too much work pressure and not enough time to grieve” as the most com-
mon complaints. It was also common among cadres to feel that their sacriﬁces
were unappreciated by their intended beneﬁciaries. In the words of one cadre,
“I’ve devoted myself totally to working on providing relief since the earthquake
occurred. I haven’t gone home for two weeks and I don’t know when I can take
a proper rest. We just work and work but many people still do not understand
how hard it has been for us and they do not care either. They are simply being
difﬁcult.”64
A national spotlight was cast on the psychological conditions of local cadres
in the earthquake zone after several of them committed suicide. The ﬁrst case
was the suicide of Dong Yufei, the director of Beichuan county’s agricultural of-61. Ibid., 281.
62. “Beichuan ganbu zhenhou shangwang fankuibao” [Postearthquake information report on the injury
and death situation of Beichuan cadres], conﬁdential party organization document.
63. Interview with NGO leader in charge of social work, Guangzhou, December 2012.
64. Chen Tao, “Social Workers as Conﬂict Mediator: Lessons from the Wenchuan Earthquake,” China
Journal of Social Work 3 (2009): 181.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 57ﬁce.65 His son had died when Qushan Elementary School collapsed, and although
his wife survived, she was severely injured. In the account of a local witness, when
Dong Yufei pulled the body of his son from the wreckage, he “held his son’s life-
less body in his arms, faced the sky and wept bitterly, calling out his son’s name
and repeating over and over the phrase: please forgive Daddy, please forgive
me.”66 Without time to mourn the death of his child or to recover from his
own injuries, Dong Yufei was immediately dispatched to work.
Almost a year after Dong Yufei’s death, Feng Xiang, Beichuan county’s pro-
paganda department assistant, similarly committed suicide.67 Feng Xiang’s son
had also died when his elementary school collapsed. To assuage the spirit of
his son, he wrote a poem that he posted online called “Child, there are no earth-
quakes in heaven.”68 In the poem, he addressed his son: “You lie in the ice-cold
ground and I don’t know if you are cold or not. Each day before dark, I worry
that you are all alone, lying there, afraid.”TAKING CARE OF THE SELF
In the Mao era, complaints about mental or emotional problems were regarded
as class based and in need of ideological correction.69 The ideology of Party spirit
and organizational discipline are intentionally designed to suppress individual
psychological needs and considerations. But in response to the high-proﬁle sui-
cides, the Party took an unprecedented step by applying psychological categories,
explanations, and techniques to earthquake zone cadres.
Cadres showing signs of distress were allowed to go to a sanitarium to conva-
lesce. In Beichuan county, the “Notice Concerning the Adjustment of Cadre Rest
Schedules” stipulated that cadres should sleep in an extra hour Monday morn-
ings, enjoy two day weekends, and leave work half an hour earlier every day. Ad-
ditionally, a “compulsory holiday roster”was established to guarantee mandatory
vacation times.7065. “5.12 da dizhen hou 5 ge yue beichuan nongban zhuren zisha” [Five months after the 5.12 great
earthquake Beichuan agricultural ofﬁce director commits suicide], Huaxi dushi bao, October 8, 2008, http://
sichuan.scol.com.cn/dwzw/20081008/200810853617.htm.
66. Ibid.
67. “Dizhen zhounian ji, dangxin zisha fengchao laixi” [On the ﬁrst anniversary of the earthquake, on the
lookout for a wave of suicides], May 14, 2009, http://www.rdzx.net/xlzx/ShowArt.asp?idp114.
68. Feng Xiang, “Haizi, tiantangli meiyou dizhen” [Child, there are no earthquakes in heaven], Sina Weibo
Blog, May 21, 2008, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4fcbc32a01009a4u.html.
69. On depression and its relationship to politics in modern China, see Sing Lee, “Depression: Coming of
Age in China,” in Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person, ed. Arthur Kleinman et al. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2011), 177–212.
70. Zhonggong beichuan qingzu zizhi xian wei bangongshi (Beichuan Qiangzu ethnicity autonomous
county party committee ofﬁce), “Beichuan ganbu ying zhen hou shou ge shuangxiu guanfang huiying dong yufei
zisha” [Beichuan cadres welcome postearthquake ﬁrst double relaxation: The ofﬁcial response to Dong Yufei’s
suicide], Guangzhou ribao, October 12, 2008, http://sichuan.scol.com.cn/dwzw/20081012/2008101293651.htm.
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58 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76Similar policies can be found in Wenchuan county’s organization department
2010 end-of-year report. The section “Pay Attention and Care about Cadres’
Physical and Mental Health” stipulated that work must not encroach on manda-
tory rest periods and alternating vacation shifts. The authorities in Abazhou Pre-
fecture organized a trip for 30 prefecture-level cadres who received “commenda-
tions” to Sichuan’s Jiuzhaigou nature preserve for “convalescence.” Wenchuan
county also established an annual vacation rotation system and regularized work
schedules for grassroots cadres engaged in reconstruction projects. Cadres who
received “commendations” from the county Party and county government com-
mittees were rewarded with a week-long vacation. Township-level cadres, espe-
cially those who had “lost family members” during the earthquake, were to be
transferred to county-level bureaus or relocated to townships near the county
seat.71
Many cadres complained that in spite of the benevolent ofﬁcial policies, they
were not able to take advantage of the two-day weekends, not to mention vaca-
tion time due to their onerous work burdens. A common refrain was that “work
cannot be put down.” In the weeks and months following the earthquake, the
high frequency of severe aftershocks and mudslides prolonged the duration of
the ongoing disaster. Cadres were responsible for relocating the displaced earth-
quake survivors into temporary housing before winter, which is brutally cold in
this mountainous area of Sichuan. As was noted earlier, even after people’s basic
safety and needs were provided for, cadres were ordered to begin the building
reconstruction process and complete it in less than two years. According to a
leading cadre from Wenchuan county, “We continuously worked until 2011.
Even though it was mandated to take a vacation, our cadres didn’t have time
to rest because our work wasn’t ﬁnished.”72
At the provincial level, the Party School in tandem with the Party organization
department held “psychological training classes” (xinli peixun ke) for over 200
cadres from villages in the earthquake zone.73 During these classes, Dong Yufei’s
suicide was examined and discussed as a “model case” of exhaustion from over-
work and untreated post–traumatic stress. A psychologist from a hospital at-
tached to Sichuan University warned: “Don’t mistakenly believe that you can
throw yourself into the most difﬁcult work and challenging circumstances in or-
der to leave behind the past and forget it.”
During the same training session, cadres were asked to “write down their
strong points” and were encouraged to “study how to view their real selves as ac-71.Wenchuanxian ganbu duiwu zhuangkuang gongzuo huibao.
72. Interview with Wenchuan county leading cadre, Wenchuan county seat, March 2013.
73. Wu Chutong, “Yi Dong yu fei zisha wei jian: zaiqu ganbu ‘xinling chongjian’” [The example of Dong
Yufei’s suicide: Disaster area cadres “mental health reconstruction”], Tianfu zaobao, October 22, 2008, http://
sichuan.scol.com.cn/dwzw/20081022/2008102252714.htm.
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 59ceptable.”74 The punitive superego language of Party spirit was supplemented
with a nurturing discourse of self-acceptance: “Even though everyone has ﬂaws
and is lacking in some way, we must optimistically improve ourselves.” Before
the training session concluded, cadres were urged to form conversation groups,
pen pals, and support networks in keeping with their special identity as both
Party cadres and disaster victims. This self-help discourse was supposed to en-
courage cadres to deal with their emotions in psychological rather than political
terms.75
Beyond the earthquake zone, a sense of psychological vulnerability has emerged
among cadres across China. According to a national survey conducted online in
2010 by sociologist Sun Liping, a majority of cadre respondents perceived them-
selves as belonging to a “marginalized and vulnerable group” (ruoshi qunti)—
an ofﬁcial sociological category typically applied to laid-off workers, migrant
workers, and other disadvantaged groups.76 Cadres described a feeling of being
squeezed between top-down pressure to display “political achievements” for their
superiors and bottom-up demands to satisfy the needs of the people. Due to their
constant exposure to scrutiny, respondents described themselves as “easily fright-
ened” (ﬁguratively described as a bird startled by the twang of a bow, jing gong zhi
niao), “anxious,” and “mentally and physically exhausted.”
There has also been growing concern among Party leaders that cadre suicides
are becoming a national problem. To understand better the psychological stress
of lower-level cadres, Party leaders invited Peng Kaiping, a professor of psychol-
ogy from the University of California at Berkeley, to the leadership compound in
Zhongnanhai to offer a course on psychology. In a later interview, Peng argued
that the majority of cadre suicides are related to their position in the political sys-
tem. In the words of Peng, it is a system of “cruel competition for promotion”
that isolates cadres from broader affective communities and networks of support:
“There is no one to whom they can vent and say what is on their mind. There are
some things they cannot say, some things they do not dare to say, and some
things they are not willing to say. This creates feelings of depression and helpless-
ness and the sense of being out of options.”77
Peng also points to an enduring political culture and Maoist legacy within the
Party, though he does not mention Mao or Maoism directly: “For a long time, we74. Tao Ling, “Sichuan shouci jizhong dui zaiqu jiceng ganbu kaizhan xinli fudao” [Sichuan’s ﬁrst time
carrying out psychological counseling focused on grassroots cadres], Huaxi dushibao, October 22, 2008, http://
sichuan.scol.com.cn/dwzw/20081022/2008102270004.htm.
75. For a fascinating perspective on “therapeutic governance” applied to laid-off workers from China’s state-
owned enterprises, see Jie Yang, Unknotting the Heart: Unemployment and Therapeutic Governance in China
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).
76. Sun Liping, “Zouxiang jiji de shehui guanlu” [Trend toward proactive social management], Shehuixue
yanjiu [Sociological studies], no. 4 (2011): 22–32.
77. Ibid.
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60 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76have looked at psychological problems [xinli wenti] as attitudinal problems
[taidu wenti], ideological problems [yishixingtai wenti] and [political] conscious-
ness problems [ juewu de wenti].” In this passage, Peng tactfully recycles key
terms from a Maoist vocabulary as antecedent conditions for the creation of a
political ecology in which cadres “refuse to admit they suffer from depression,”
afraid it will be viewed as being “weak willed.”CONCLUSION
In 1968, when surveying the damage to Party authority being caused by the Cul-
tural Revolution, Benjamin Schwartz asked, “Have theMaoists attacked the Party?
What indeed is the Party as such? . . . To any genuine Marxist-Leninist, it is, of
course more than its cell and anatomy. It is a metaphysical organism which is
more than the sum of its parts.”78 This article draws inspiration from Schwartz’s
willingness to reﬂexively question the fundamental political categories of Chinese
politics.
This article has attempted to address the question, what is a Communist Party
cadre? The Communist Party cultivates and invests the life of the individual cadre
with its authority. Whereas the question of mandatory political education and in-
doctrination for leaders is not a feature of liberal democratic governance, in China’s
political system the cadre is a vital target of governance, training, and interven-
tion. For these reasons, the ideal typology of the Communist Party cadre should
not be conﬂated with the generic and vague categories of Weberian “bureau-
crats,”79 “experts,”80 “economic actors,”81 or “administrators.”82 Although cadres
are responsible for state administration and economic growth, as Party cadres
they are also subject to a lifelong process of ideological training and organiza-
tional discipline.
The Party’s organizational ethos of subordination and sacriﬁce is perfectly ex-
pressed in Liu Shaoqi’s How to Be a Communist:
A Party member has interests of his own, which may be inconsistent with or even
run counter to the interests of the Party in certain circumstances. Should this hap-78. Benjamin Schwartz, “The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural
Revolution,” in Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, ed. John Wilson Lewis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 149–69.
79. MaxWeber, “Politics as Vocation,” in FromMaxWeber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Geerth
and C. Wright Mills (New York: Galaxy, 1958), 77–97.
80. Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: The Cultural Revolution and the Origins of China’s New Class
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 223.
81. Jean Oi, “The Role of the Local State in China’s Transitional Economy,” China Quarterly, no. 144
(1995): 1137.
82. Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transitions and the Politics of Governance in
China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
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Party Spirit Made Flesh • 61pen, it is incumbent on him to sacriﬁce his personal interests and unconditionally
subordinate them to the interests of the Party; under no pretence or excuse may he
sacriﬁce the Party’s interests by clinging to his own. . . . Hence a Party member can
and must completely merge his personal interests with those of the Party. . . . It is
all the more necessary for each cadre and leader of the Party to be a living embodi-
ment of the general interests of the Party and the proletariat.
Liu argues that Party spirit requires the endurance of “humiliations without bit-
terness if the occasion so demands”83—which is the ultimate test of faith and de-
votion.84
In a China that has long since abandoned its revolutionary mission and ethos
of class struggle, Liu’s words seem to be from a bygone age. The stereotypical im-
age of today’s cadre is a most likely corrupt ofﬁcial wearing Louis Vuitton and
certainly not an austere communist engaged in revolutionary struggle from a
cave in Yan’an in the 1930s. I suggest however that Liu Shaoqi’s words remain
relevant for the simple reason that the Chinese Communist Party is still a Lenin-
ist party governed by ideology and organization. In quotidian circumstances, this
point fades into the background only to reemerge during emergency situations,
such as the Sichuan earthquake, and anticorruption campaigns in which targeted
cadres appear in humiliating televised confessions (a formula in which the dis-
graced cadre apologizes to the Party for letting it down). In both cases, the indi-
vidual cadre is sacriﬁced for the glory of the Party.
My argument that cadres are Party spirit made ﬂesh does not mean that the
ﬂesh is healthy or saintly. As we have seen, in the aftermath of the earthquake,
local cadres experienced physical exhaustion, anxieties, and nightmares. After
several cadres took their own lives, the Party responded with a new therapeutic
discourse addressing the psychological needs of the cadre as an individual. How-
ever, I suggest that psychological individualization of cadres can only be a tem-
porary measure. The Party’s logic of legitimation and discursive apparatus neces-
sitates the exploitation of individual cadres in the name of Party spirit. The
contradiction between the general needs of the Party and the individual needs
of the cadre will always be resolved in favor of the former. Xi Jinping’s anti-
corruption campaign is only the latest iteration of this logic.
Xi Jinping’s goal is to revive the ﬂesh of the Party—ﬂesh that would not be
inaccurately described as necrotic, considering that the Chinese word for corrup-
tion, fubai, is etymologically associated with “rotten meat.” There is nothing new
or shocking about Xi’s objective or the tools he is using to pursue it. It is entirely
consistent with the Party’s discursive tradition of describing anticorruption and
Party rectiﬁcation as a hygienic andmedical procedure. In thewords of Liu Shaoqi,83. Liu, How to Be a Good Communist.
84. In hindsight, this passage is heartbreaking.
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62 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 76“as comrade Mao Zedong puts it, we must constantly ‘sweep the ﬂoor and wash
our faces’ so as to prevent political dust and germs from clouding the minds of
our comrades and decaying the body of our Party.”85 Mao himself repeatedly ex-
tolled criticism and self-criticism as a processes of “treating the disease to save the
patient” (zhi bing jiu ren)—a phrase that remains a Party axiom today. In a recent
publication from theCentral Party School, Xi’s anticorruption campaignwas com-
pared to an “excision of evil, malignant tumors” in the organism of the Party.86
Although it is prudent for scholars to refrain from making grim or glowing
prognostications about the fate of Communist Party, we can at least listen to
how it is diagnosing itself. The source of the Communist Party’s vitality is Party
spirit, and it will employ whatever measures necessary to preserve it.85. Liu, How to Be a Good Communist.
86. Huang Xianghuai, “Xin Jinping lun jiankang zhengzhi shengtai” [Xin Jinping’s theory on healthy po-
litical ecology], Zhongguo gongchandang xinwen wang (Chinese Communist Party news website), June 3, 2015,
http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0603/c168825-27099150.html.
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